The paper studies the effects of tax policy on venture capital activity. Entrepreneurs pursue a single high risk project each but have no own resources. Financiers provide equity finance. They must structure the entrepreneur's profit share and base salary to assure their incentives for full effort. In addition to providing equity finance, venture capitalists assist with valuable business advice to enhance survival rates. Within a general equilibrium framework with a traditional and an entrepreneurial sector, the paper investigates the effects of taxes on the equilibrium level of entrepreneurship and managerial advice. It considers differential wage and capital income taxes, a comprehensive income tax, incomplete loss offset, progressive taxation as well as investment and output subsidies to the entrepreneurial sector.
Introduction
Financing early stage businesses involves special problems and is fundamentally different from financing investments by mature and well established companies. Because of lacking collateral and the absence of any past track record, and due to their informational advantages, pioneering entrepreneurs often face severe difficulties in convincing banks to finance projects with potentially high returns but high risks as well. Another problem that contains the roots of business failure, is the commercial inexperience of new entrepreneurs. They tend to be equipped with excellent technical science expertise but usually lack business experience and managerial training. Venture capital has come to specialize in financing early stage investment. Venture capitalists (VCs) not only supply equity finance but also provide valuable business advice to enhance survival chances of new start-ups. Viewing start-up investment as a key source of innovation, growth and employment, policy makers often emphasize the need to enhance entrepreneurship and venture capital activity.
1
The traditional literature on entrepreneurship, risk bearing and taxation ignores a distinct feature of venture capital finance, i.e. the productive contribution of financiers to the survival and success of start-up firms. 2 The tax literature on adverse selection in investment finance similarly excludes an active role of financiers. 3 Despite the importance attached to venture capital by the policy community, a systematic analysis of public policy in this context has largely been neglected. The exceptions are Gordon (1998) and Poterba (1989a,b) . Gordon points to the importance of tax avoidance through business ownership as a determinant of entrepreneurship. In this context, he briefly addresses the implications of asymmetric information for the availability of outside equity finance such as venture 1 A recent OECD report on Austria, for example, includes a special feature on promoting entrepreneurship, see OECD (1999) . Similar issues are also discussed in European Commission (1999) . 2 See, for example, Boadway et al. (1991) , Peck (1989) , Kihlstrom and Laffont (1983) , Mintz (1981) , Kanbur (1980) , and Buchholz and Konrad (1999) for a recent overview. 3 See DeMeza and Webb (1987, 1988) , Innes (1991) , Konrad and Richter (1995) and Boadway et al.
(1998), among others.
capital and also studies the role of various tax instruments. Poterba investigates the effects of capital gains taxes on the supply of venture capital. Neither of them is very specific on the contractual problems in VC finance. Both abstract from managerial support and tax incentives on this margin. Many business failures, however, result from avoidable management mistakes that originate in the managerial incompetence of entrepreneurs in the early stages of their career. An active role of VCs in providing valuable business advice might be an important factor in raising survival chances of start-up businesses. It thus seems interesting to ask which factors determine the incentives to provide advice.
Could taxes and other government activity improve upon such incentives and, thereby, boost survival rates by improving the 'quality' of venture capital finance?
This paper extends the existing literature on entrepreneurship and taxation in allowing for an active role of financiers and providing an analysis of various tax policy initiatives.
We propose a stylized general equilibrium model of entrepreneurship and venture capital, featuring two sectors: one producing 'traditional' goods and another entrepreneurial sector where an 'innovative' good is produced with an inherently risky technology, and where informational problems loom large. The model conforms well with some important stylized facts of venture capital finance. 4 Financiers provide start-up finance in exchange for an equity share. The typical arrangement consists of a low base salary combined with profit participation. In financing a portfolio of companies, venture capital funds are able to diversify risk and could, in principle, fully insure the entrepreneur. Risk diversification, however, is limited by the extent of moral hazard in the relation between entrepreneur and financier. The equity contract must thus be structured to retain the entrepreneur's full committment and effort in the face of a moral hazard problem that results from entrepreneurial effort being non-observable and non-verifiable. While the entrepreneur's effort certainly is critical for the venture to have any positive survival chance at all, the financier also contributes with valuable business advice to further enhance survival rates. 4 See Sahlmann (1990), Lerner (1995) , Gompers (1995) , and Black and Gilson (1998) , among others.
Gompers and Lerner (1999) provide a systematic account of how the venture capital industry works. 5 In focusing on the advisory activity and tax incentives, the paper obviously neglects other important
Apart from solving incentive problems with respect to entrepreneurial effort, the venture capital contract must be sufficiently generous to attract entrepreneurs in the presence of alternative career opportunities. Agents may either go for a safe worker's salary in the traditional sector or opt for an entrepreneurial career with potentially high rewards but high risk as well. The equilibrium solution with occupational choice splits the population into entrepreneurs, consultants and workers and endogenously determines the quality of venture capital finance (i.e. the extent of managerial advice). We then investigate the effects of a broad range of tax instruments such as differential wage and corporate income taxes, progressive taxation, incomplete loss offsets, an investment subsidy and an output subsidy to portfolio companies. The paper now proceeds with presenting the model in section 2. Section 3 discusses the effects of proportional taxes on the equilibrium level of managerial advice and venture capital backed start-up investment. Section 4 addresses the welfare implications of policy. Section 5 considers incomplete loss offset and progressive taxation. Section 6 summarizes and discusses future research. Risk, Effort and Advice: Survival probability p is assumed to depend on effort e which cannot be verified and contracted by an outside investor. A minimum amount 0 < δ < 1 of the entrepreneur's time input is freely observable. Only the rest of time 1 − δ is under discretion and is assumed not to be observable by outsiders. High effort means that, in addition to the basic activity δ, the entrepreneur also devotes 1 − δ of her time exclusively to the venture. Low effort or shirking means that it is directed to some lucrative outside activity. Only high effort implies a positive survival chance p > 0, while low effort results in business failure for sure, p = 0. We suppress the effort variable in the probability p, knowing that it is positive only if the entrepreneur supplies high effort. In addition to the entrepreneur's effort, we also postulate a productive contribution of the VC consisting of some managerial services a:
Taxation of Portfolio Company: A corporate income tax (CIT) at rate τ and an output subsidy of σ to innovative goods give an expected net income of the portfolio 6 We use p 0 as a short-hand for dp/da. company equal to
where Q is the consumer price of innovative goods. Profits are reduced by the entrepreneur's base salary b. Setting up a business also requires a fixed start-up investment K, part of which is subsidized with an investment tax credit at rate z. Investment demand is for traditional goods. In case of business failure, the company runs up a loss equal to the base salary and the start-up investment cost net of taxes. At this stage, we assume that VCs can offset any losses against income from successful projects.
Taxation of Venture Capitalist: Entrepreneurs have no funds of their own. To get the firm started, the VC must thus inject equity in the amount of
which is in exchange for a share 1 − s of the company's cash flow. The VC earns gross revenues (1 − s) Q (1 + σ) and pays CIT on her own expected operating profits equal to
where equity purchases equal to I are not deductible. VC firms hire a 'consultants' per project to supply business advice. Note that the VC calculates with expected profits because she is assumed to hold a diversified portfolio of start-up companies that eliminates all income risk on her part. For each project, her expected, net of tax profit is
The entrepreneur's income directly subtracts from the amount of income that may possibly be claimed by the VC. The expected cost of entrepreneurial compensation to the VC is
It will prove useful to write expected, net profits of the VC firm as
Taxation of Entrepreneur: Apart from a base salary b, the entrepreneur receives income from her equity share s in the company. Suppose, for simplicity, that the CIT rate τ is equal to the personal tax rate on capital income. There is no further tax burden at the individual level. The entrepreneur's base salary, however, is subject to a wage tax at rate t. Expected entrepreneurial income net of taxes thus amounts to
Demand: Agent i with income Y i consumes quantities C i and D i of traditional and innovative goods, respectively. Demand derives from utility maximization subject to a budget constraint, (
where v is the rate of a uniform consumption tax. Being endowed with preferences u = ln
for convenience, agents spend
Indirect utility V i is concave in disposable income Y i . The logarithmic specification of utility implies constant relative risk aversion equal to unity.
Labor Allocation: Given our technological assumptions, and with L denoting the number of workers and E the number of entrepreneurs, the supply of traditional goods is L and that of innovative goods S = pE. Apart from the entrepreneurial input, production of the innovative good is enhanced by managerial advice which requires aE consultants in total. The production possibilities are thus traced out by an allocation of labor satisfying the resource constraint. Given a population of mass one, labor market clearing requires
Income: All agents potentially receive profits Π i from ownership of VC firms which will be zero, however, in equilibrium with free entry. Apart from this, individual disposable income depends on the agent's occupation. A worker obtains a safe salary equal to the wage rate net of the wage tax t, i.e. Y i = 1 − t + Π i . 7 The entrepreneur's income is risky and equal to c N + Π i in expected value. Given symmetry within each occupational group, aggregate disposable income is
The aggregate budget constraint reads (C + QD)(1
Public Sector: The government collects taxes and hands out subsidies. Any net revenue is rebated as a consumption subsidy. It will become apparent that a proportional consumption subsidy with a uniform rate is neutral and, thus, allows to isolate the allocative effects of other distortive taxes. 9 The government budget constraint is
Apart from the salaries of L workers, both the base salary b of each entrepreneur and the wage income of aE consultants are liable to the wage tax at rate t. While tax revenue from each project is risky, the government's revenue is deterministic since the law of large numbers consolidates stochastically independent risks.
Market Clearing: Commodity market clearing requires
Using (2), (5), (9), and (10), disposable income in (8) is also written as
To verify Walras' Law, substitute the budget constraint (C + QD) (1 + v) = Y into (11) and get (C + KE − L) + Q (D − pE) = 0. The sum of valued excess demands is zero. 7 Recall that the wage rate is unity by choice of the numeraire. 8 Profits from VC firms are R 1 0 Π i di = ΠE but will be zero in equilibrium with free entry. 9 Lump-sum per capita transfers, in contrast, are not neutral because they affect the incentive compatible provisions of the equity contract. They are introduced in section 5.
Venture Capital Activity

Incentive Contract
The following sequence of events determines individual decision making. Occupational choice comes first. Workers receive a safe wage, set their consumption levels and derive utility as in (6) . If agents opt for an entrepreneurial career, they approach a VC to fund their project. An equity share and base salary is negotiated, and the VC promises to support the venture with a verifyable level of advice. Given the contractional arrangement, the entrepreneur chooses effort and the VC supplies managerial advice. Next, risk is resolved and state-dependent income determined. Knowing income, consumption and welfare of entrepreneurs is given by (6) .
The VC buys an equity stake 1 − s at a cost I that covers both the entrepreneur's base salary b and the fixed start-up investment K. The remuneration of entrepreneurs is optimally specified in a venture capital contract and must provide sufficient incentives for their participation and effort. To maximize profits in (4), the VC chooses s and b as well as a level of advice a. Her maximization problem is conveniently decomposed into two stages. For any given level of advice, she first minimizes the cost c of obtaining the entrepreneur's participation. Knowing how contract cost depends on advice, she then chooses a to maximize profits. The second stage of profit maximization is taken up in the next subsection.
In contracting with the entrepreneur (agent), the VC (principal) structures the terms of the contract to solve the incentive problems arising from asymmetric information.
Given the entrepreneur's other job opportunities, the contract must be generous enough to secure her participation. For this reason, the contract cost in part reflects the foregone alternative income such as a worker's safe salary equal to net wages,
To retain survival chances of start-ups, remuneration of entrepreneurs must also provide sufficient incentives for high effort. However, the contract cannot be made contingent on 10 From now on, we set Π i = 0. Profits are zero in the competitive VC sector with free entry. giving b+1−δ in total. With taxes, the entrepreneur's net income is lower. A proportional wage tax at rate t is subtracted from all sources of wage income while the CIT cuts into profit income. Defining 
The contract must specify profit participation and base salary such that both the participation (PC) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints are satisfied. The PC compares expected utility derived from entrepreneurship with utility from a safe worker's salary.
The IC is fulfilled if expected utility from supplying high effort is no lower than utility from shirking. Given that the VC cannot observe shirking, the base salary must be paid in all cases. Income from shirking thus consists of the base salary plus any outside income that the entrepreneur would derive from working 1 − δ of her time somewhere else.
11 Given indirect utility as in (6), the constraints should take into account the logarithm of the consumer
These terms, however, cancel out on each side. The consumption tax -and indeed the CPI -are neutral with respect to the contract! Only net income flows matter.
As a benchmark, we first consider the full information case. When the principal can costlessly verify effort, the contract may be conditioned on effort without any incentive problems. Since the principal holds a fully diversified portfolio of companies while the risk-averse agent pursues a single project only, it is efficient to provide insurance. The
Minimizing cost then gives an optimality condition wage tax rate exceeds the CIT rate, the VC will shift some risk to the entrepreneur even in the absence of incentive problems, because the VC's effective cost of providing a safe salary exceeds the amount that the entrepreneur obtains net of taxes. Put differently, the entrepreneur prefers low taxed profit income over high taxed wage income and will accept some risk in exchange for the tax advantage. In Figure 1 , the slopes of the PC and the cost line differ at the full insurance point.
With asymmetric information, both constraints are binding whence we obtain the solution by computing the intersection of them. Figure 1 illustrates. Moving away from full insurance along the PC, the reduction of the base salary must be compensated by ever higher profit shares such that expected income exceeds the safe alternative by a premium to reward for risk bearing. If τ = t, we have c = c N , and expected income c N from the equity contract exceeds the net wage of a worker by the risk premium. For an analytical solution, substitute the definition of β and get ln (
The PC then gives 1
We note some immediate implications for tax incidence. The base salary just compensates for the opportunity cost in terms of foregone wages of the entrepreneur's basic time input δ and is exogenous. For a given survival rate p, the entrepreneur's profit income θ depends only on the base salary net of the wage tax. Since θ = s (1 − τ ) Q(1 + σ), the CIT is thus fully shifted to the VC while the entrepreneur is compensated by an increase in the profit share to obtain the same overall income in case of success. Similarly, the output subsidy σ fully accrues to the VC while the entrepreneur is able to capture not even part of it.
In contrast, a higher wage tax reduces the alternative income and allows the VC, ceteris paribus, to cut the entrepreneur's profit share and still retain her participation and high effort. The burden of the wage tax lies as much with entrepreneurs as with workers. In equilibrium, however, the survival rate is endogenously determined which will then affect the described pattern of tax shifting.
The overall contract cost that the VC must incur to attract the entrepreneur determines her residual expected income and willingness to invest. It depends on taxes. In raising survival chances p (a) through more intensive managerial advice, the VC herself may control the cost. Appendix A proves the following properties:
compatible compensation of the entrepreneur satisfies c 0 ≡ dc dp < 0, c 00 ≡ d 2 c dp 2 > 0;
There are two offsetting influences of p on cost. On the one hand, a higher survival rate raises cost since high income must be paid with higher probability. On the other hand, when project risk declines, the principal may ensure participation of the entrepreneur with a smaller risk premium. The VC is therefore able to squeeze the entrepreneur's profit share in the successful state, ∂θ ∂p < 0. The second effect dominates and marginal cost falls.
Furthermore, the cost function is unambiguously convex in the survival rate. The wage tax allows to cut the entrepreneur's profit share and, thereby, reduces the VC's contract cost since it makes the alternative career option less attractive. The CIT also squeezes cost. Since the base salary is tax deductible in the portfolio company, the government effectively pays for part of it. Note finally that contract cost is completely independent of the output subsidy σ to innovative goods. The subsidy boosts the company's cash flow in case of success but the VC simply cuts the profit share and appropriates all of it.
Managerial Advice
Only successfully launched businesses eventually contribute to the VC's revenues. According to (1), however, VCs may themselves contribute to higher survival chances of their portfolio companies and strengthen their revenues by giving business advice. In raising the survival rate, more advice also allows to squeeze the entrepreneur's risk premium over safe wage income by making entrepreneurial income more certain, whence the venture may be obtained at a lower contract cost. Advice, however, is costly and results in operating costs gross of taxes equal to a per project. The profit maximizing level of advice is most easily analyzed by rewriting (4) as
We refer to m as cost to market which is the expected cost incurred in order to produce one unit of the innovative good. On average, one must start 1/p projects to accomplish this. Apart from savings in contract cost, an increase in the survival rate now reduces cost to market because a smaller number of projects need to be started for each successful one. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the VC's advisory activity are, thus,
The second order condition is fullfilled by the curvature properties of p (a, g) and c(p; t, τ ).
12 p 0 and Π 0 denote derivatives with respect to a, while c 0 denotes the derivative w.r.t. p.
Equilibrium
Zero Profits and Managerial Advice: As long as they make additional profits, VCs attract ever more entrepreneurs E and generate more business start-ups. In equilibrium, the price of innovative goods must satisfy the zero profit condition relating to (15),
With free entry and zero profits, the cost m of bringing a venture to the market must be equal to the producer price net of the CIT. The intensity of managerial advice and the equilibrium market price are solved recursively. Imposing the zero profit condition (17) on the individual optimality condition of the VC in (16) gives
where c depends on a only via its effect on p. With taxes given, this equation autonomously fixes the level of managerial advice. In equilibrium, the VC's marginal benefit of supplying more advice is p 0 (m − c 0 ). More advice boosts survival rates which directly reduces cost to market, and does so indirectly as well, since a lower risk allows to cut the profit share of the entrepreneur. In providing more advice, the VC incurs a marginal cost equal to 1 − τ . Once the level of advice is known, p, c, and m are determined which, in turn, fixes the demand price Q according to (17) .
Number of Entrepreneurs:
We impose labor market clearing and budget constraints and solve for the number of entrepreneurs that equilibrate the market for innovative goods. Walras' Law then implies market clearing for standard goods as well. Given neutrality of the consumption tax, equilibrium will be independent of its rate. We start with the observation in (6) that agents spend a fixed share of disposable income
denotes gross factor income. 13 Before we equate 13 To rebate tax revenues, the government gives a consumption subsidy, i.e. v < 0. A consumption tax is charged only when an output or investment subsidy must be financed.
demand and supply, we compute gross income by replacing the consumption subsidy from the government budget in (9) . Using (8), (7), (5) and (12), disposable income is
where the zero profit condition, by way of (15) and (13),
and replacing L from (7), gross income emerges as
Equate supply and demand in the entrepreneurial sector, pE
particular that in zero profit equilibrium, managerial advice, survival probability, contract cost c and cost to market m are all autonomously determined by (18) independently from the rest of the model. Figure 2 illustrates the solution for the untaxed equilibrium with the number of entrepreneurs being the equilibrating variable. In this case, gross income
demand is autonomous but it increases
with E for the simple reason that average income of entrepreneurs exceeds wages by a risk premium c − 1. The demand schedule is flatter than the supply curve such that the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs given by the intersection is smaller than unity. By the zero profit condition (17) , the number of entrepreneurs is E = 1−α 1−α+a+K+αc < 1. By the same steps, entrepreneurship in the taxed equilibrium is given by
3 Entrepreneurship
Cost to Market
The recursive structure of the model greately simplifies policy analysis. Cost to market and managerial advice may be solved independently of the rest of the model. Note that (18) is equivalent to m 0 = 0 which is also the condition for minimum cost to market
. Profit maximization combined with free entry is, thus, equivalent to cost minimization and yields the same level of advice.
14 Applying the envelope theorem to the minimization problem and using proposition 1 gives
Wage taxation allows to cut entrepreneurial compensation since it reduces alternative income. Wage taxes thus reduce cost to market and boost profits of VC firms. They start to attract more entrepreneurs and will bring more start-up companies to market.
The market price falls until, in equilibrium, profits are sqeezed to zero again and no more projects are funded. Because the base salary and advisory costs are tax deductible, the CIT effectively subsidizes these expenditures and reduces cost to market as well. A subsidy z to start-up investment similarly reduces cost to market. An output subsidy is unable to affect cost to market and, thereby, the zero profit producer price. It is completely passed on to consumers by reducing their demand price Q.
Managerial Advice
VCs not only provide equity finance but also supply valuable business advice. Do taxes impair incentives to provide managerial advice? Condition (18) implicitly determines the extent of consulting when market entry is free and competition eliminates profits in VC finance. Taking the differential thereof shows how policy induces VCs to adjust advice in equilibrium. Using the partials listed in (B.2) yields
where the elasticity µ is defined in (A.2) . Henceforth, we use r to denote a comprehensive income tax, i.e. r = t = τ = z. With signs determined in (B.2), the equilibrium effects of taxation on incentives to give advice are summarized as 14 Imposing zero profits on (16), the necessary and sufficient conditions of the two problems are related according to Π 0 = −pm 0 = 0 and Π 00 = −pm 00 < 0 whence the cost function m is indeed convex.
Proposition 2 (Managerial Advice)
In equilibrium with free entry, the intensity of managerial advice increases with a higher corporate income tax, while a higher investment subsidy and higher wage taxes discourage advice. An output subsidy and a comprehensive income tax are neutral:
The CIT seemingly holds ambiguous incentives for advice. As indicated by (15) and (18), the marginal benefit p 0 (m − c 0 ) of giving more advice is a higher survival rate which saves costs, since fewer projects need to be started for each successful one. On the one hand, a higher CIT reduces the marginal benefit of business advice by p 0 ∂m ∂τ
When start-up cost becomes smaller due to the implicit tax subsidy associated with a higher CIT rate, then less is saved by raising the survival rate and the marginal benefit of advice declines accordingly. On the other hand, since advisory costs are tax deductible, a higher CIT rate reduces the marginal cost of advice by −dτ and thereby encourages managerial support. The net effect is positive. 15 Via the effect on managerial advice, the CIT tends to strengthen survival chances of new start-ups. A comprehensive income tax avoids interfering with VCs' incentives since it affects marginal benefits and costs of advice proportionately.
Entrepreneurship
With an endogenous survival rate, the number of entrepreneurs E willing to start up new projects is no longer proportional to and must be distinguished from the number of successful projects pE. How then is tax policy affecting entrepreneurship and supply in the innovative sector? The quality of VC finance, i.e. the intensity of consulting, determines entrepreneurial risk and thereby affects agents' willingness to opt for an entrepreneurial career. Are tax incentives for advice in line with the tax effects on occupational choice? To
2) of the appendix, the effect of the CIT is positive, Wage Tax: In the general case, we start from a taxed equilibrium. Take the differential of (19) and use the f.o.c. m
As a direct effect, the wage tax reduces cost to market and thereby strengthens demand by means of a lower output price. On the other hand, lower net wages render the entrepreneur's alternative career option less attractive. The VC is thus able to save on entrepreneurial compensation which reduces demand. The price effect is seen to dominate, and VCs will fund more projects and attract more entrepreneurs to restore equilibrium.
The second term in the curly bracket is an indirect effect of the wage tax that stems from the diminished incentives for managerial advice, see (21) . Less intensive advice contributes to excess demand and further stimulates entrepreneurship.
A higher wage tax entices more start-ups but each one receives less advice from VCs and is, thus, less likely to succeed. What is then the net effect on pE, the supply of innovative goods? Using (22) and introducing Ψ = 1 − α − pEΦ/p 0 , we obtain
To sign Ψ, we write
by (17) . Replace p 0 in the second term by (18) and rearrange,
The condition holds in the untaxed equilibrium where pQ = pm = c+a+K. In this case, pQ−(1 + a + K) = c−1 > 0 is equal to the risk premium. By continuity, the condition will be satisfied as long as tax rates are not too large. With a comprehensive income tax and a zero output subsidy,
i.e. t = τ = z > 0 and σ = 0, the condition is again related to the entrepreneur's risk
> 0, and is therefore satisfied even for large taxes. With the inequality 1 − α < EpQ thus established, the first two terms in Ψ are negative and the third one is negative anyway. With Ψ < 0, the wage tax is seen to boost output of innovative goods. The fact that the wage tax discourages consulting, reinforces the direct effects on entrepreneurship and aggregate supply.
Capital Income Tax: Similar calculations reveal the effects on entrepreneurship and industry supply that are induced by the CIT and the investment subsidy, respectively:
An increase in the investment subsidy leads to a rise in both the number of entrepreneurs and of successful projects. It lowers cost to market of innovative goods which expands supply and attracts additional entrepreneurs. In discouraging VC advice, the subsidy reinforces both the number of start-ups and aggregate supply and thereby expands the entrepreneurial sector. The CIT has opposite effects. It lowers cost to market as well.
However, since it hits revenues even more forcefully, the relative market price of innovative goods is higher which reduces output and demand for entrepreneurs.
Comprehensive Income Tax: A comprehensive income tax features common rates for the wage tax t, the CIT τ , and the investment subsidy z. A comprehensive income tax was shown to be neutral with respect to the level of managerial advice. It turns out that this broad-based tax with full loss offset neither affects entrepreneurship nor the supply of innovative goods. In (19) , the direct effect of the tax would enter through m/ (1 − r) but the tax factor cancels out since all terms in m including θ as given in (14) are proportional to (1 − r). Consequently,
Output Subsidy: In zero profit equilibrium with free entry of VCs, an output subsidy σ avoids to distort incentives for advice. It affects neither survival chances nor cost to market. In subsidizing consumer prices, however, the subsidy boosts demand for innovative goods and, thereby, encourages entrepreneurship and aggregate supply,
where we used
Proposition 3 (Entrepreneurship)
A wage tax, an investment subsidy and an output subsidy raise the number of entrepreneurs and industry supply. The CIT works in the opposite direction. A comprehensive income tax with full loss offset is neutral.
Welfare
Tax policy affects the incentives of VCs to advise entrepreneurs and thereby influences the survival rates of start-up businesses. It also affects the propensity of households to opt for an entrepreneurial career. What are the normative implications of tax policy from a welfare theoretic point of view? The main complication compared to a standard competitive economy is the presence of asymmetric information in the relation between entrepreneurs and financiers. To avoid moral hazard and to retain survival chances of start-up ventures, the equity contract must be arranged to provide entrepreneurs with powerful incentives for full effort. For this reason, entrepreneurs must bear risk via profit participation even though full risk diversification would be possible in principle. In the presence of unconsolidated risk, taxation could provide further insurance. It is expected, however, that further diversification is counterproductive since it conflicts with private arrangements to contain moral hazard. We now proceed with an explicit welfare analysis to check this conjecture.
The Welfare Measure: To investigate the welfare consequences of tax policy, we analyze (ex ante) welfare of agents prior to occupational choice. 16 Given a price index
see (6) . In equilibrium, expected utility from entrepreneurship is exactly matched by utility from a safe job in industry. The participation constraint holds with equality.
Therefore, utility V i of a worker which depends on the after tax real wage (1 − t) /P , is a complete welfare measure. 17 The marginal welfare effect is, thus,
Welfare depends on the real wage net of taxes. Tax policy thus affects welfare via three channels: (i) the after-tax wage; (ii) the consumption tax; and (iii) the price of innovative goods. The wage tax determines (i) while (ii) and (iii) reflect the price index. As indicated in (20) , tax policy affects the cost to market m and, thereby, the price Q = m/[(1 − τ )(1 + σ)] which obtains under perfect competition and free entry of VCs. In particular, 16 Boadway et al. (1991) provide a welfare analysis in several models of occupational choice. 17 This ex ante welfare measure also corresponds to a social welfare function which adds up ex post utility levels of different agents. The population splits into 1 − E workers and E entrepreneurs of whom pE are successful and (1 − p) E fail. Given net income Y i ∈ {1 − t, θ + β, β}, social welfare amounts to
Since the participation constraint binds with equality, pV (
, social welfare is again given by V = ln(
the welfare evaluation of taxes must take account of the fact that revenues are rebated by means of a consumption subsidy.
As a first step in evaluating (27), we compute the differential of the government budget constraint to obtain the adjustment in the consumption subsidy. For the rest of this section, we start from an untaxed equilibrium position and derive the marginal welfare effects of introducing small taxes from zero. This way, we avoid complicated tax base effects that would identify the excess burden of taxes. With small taxes, the excess burden is zero to the first order. The remaining welfare effect must then be due to other distortions if there are any. The differential of the public budget constraint in (9) is
In the untaxed equilibrium, the tax base of the consumption subsidy is equal to income
By way of (7) 
where the last equality exploits the conditions for zero profits and equilibrium in the Proposition 4 (Welfare Effects of Taxes) Using a proportional consumption tax or subsidy to balance the budget, and starting from an untaxed equilibrium, the welfare effects from a small wage tax, CIT, and small output and investment subsidies are zero.
Extensions
Having discussed the major taxes being relevant for start-up investment by risk-bearing entrepreneurs, we now proceed with two further scenarios. In practice, tax systems are often restrictive to some extent in allowing VC funds to offset losses from failures against profits from successful start-ups. The first subsection thus addresses the effects on entrepreneurship, managerial advice, and welfare when the income tax allows for less than full loss offsets. The second subsection turns to a redistributive policy that levies a proportional consumption tax in order to finance a uniform per capita transfer. This scenario mimicks an indirectly progressive tax. Obviously, such transfers are relatively more important in case of failure when the entrepreneur is left with a modest base salary only, as compared to the exceptionally high income generated by a successful start-up. Such transfers provide welcome insurance to entrepreneurs. However, risk bearing and ex post income inequality is required to contain the moral hazard problem. It will be important to investigate how such a redistributive tax transfer scheme interacts with the financial arrangements of the VC contract.
Restricted Loss Offsets:
Consider an initial situation where a comprehensive income tax at rate r with full loss offset is in place and revenues are rebated by means of a proportional consumption subsidy at rate v < 0. All other taxes and subsidies including lump-sum transfers are set to zero. The loss offset is relevant only for the VC since the portfolio company doesn't come into existence when the project fails. While government fully taxes profits at rate r, VCs are denied to deduct a fraction ε of losses from their tax liability with ε = 0 at the outset. We now consider the effects of restricting full loss offset by increasing ε. The income tax rate is kept constant but the consumption subsidy adjusts to rebate any excess revenues.
The VC injects equity I = b + K gross of taxes for a share 1 − s of prospective returns.
The VC's profit from a successful start-up is
I is borrowed from other agents and must be subtracted. In case of failure, she incurs a
since only a fraction 1 − ε of losses can be offset against dividends from other projects. The VC's expected, net of tax profit per project
Full loss offset is given by ε = 0 and γ = 1 which results in (2) again when a comprehensive income tax with τ = t = z = r is in place and σ = 0. Appendix C now repeats in Table   C .1 all those elements of the basic model that will change due to the presence of restricted loss offset and lump-sum transfers. The modified equations are primed.
In case of failure, the VC runs up losses of a + b + K which include her own operating expenses for advice, the entrepreneur's base salary, and the start-up investment cost.
When restricting loss offset, the government fully taxes profits from a successful start-up but participates relatively less in the loss from project failure. Consequently, contract cost (13') and cost to market (15') both increase when a larger share ε of losses are not tax deductible from other revenues. Profit maximization with free entry and minimization of cost to market are equivalent since they result in the same optimality condition (18').
Applying the envelope theorem to m = min a c(p;ε,T )+(1−γr)(a+K) p
shows that increasing the share ε of non-deductible losses inflates cost to market according to
However, limiting the loss offset holds inherently ambiguous incentives for managerial 18 For reasons of space, we also include the effects of transfers which are discussed below.
advice. Taking the differential of (18'), Π 00 da = − ∂Π 0 ∂ε dε, and using (C.5), gives
Restricting loss offset ε raises marginal cost of advice by
. The square bracket in (18') identifies the marginal benefit which stems from an increase in the survival rate by p 0 . The first part of the marginal benefit, p 0 m, reflects the fact that a higher probability of success directly reduces cost to market. According to (20'), limiting loss offset raises the marginal benefit by p 0 ∂m ∂ε
. The second component
captures the savings in entrepreneurial compensation. A higher survival chance not only squeezes the entrepreneur's risk premium, but also reduces the VC's effective contract cost of the base salary since a higher survival rate makes the tax disadvantage from limited loss offset hit less likely. If the loss offset is restricted further, the VC derives an even higher marginal benefit from more advice which helps to avoid a larger tax disadvantage. By (C.4), the marginal benefit increases by −p
Finally, part of marginal benefits stem from avoiding the tax disadvantage of limited loss offset for costs other than the base salary, p 0 r (a + K) ε. By the same reasoning, if a larger share ε of losses is not deductible, the VC again faces higher incentives to avoid this tax disadvantage, and marginal benefit of advice increases by p 0 r (a + K). Adding up gives the second term in the square bracket of (21'). Restricting loss offset thus increases both marginal benefits and marginal costs of advice such that the net effect is ambiguous.
Restricting the loss offset affects entrepreneurship directly as well as indirectly by its implication for managerial advice. Using the optimality condition m 0 = 0 and defining
> 0, the differential of (19') yields
By (20'), a restricted loss offset raises the tax cost of VC operations and inflates cost to market. By this direct effect, government discourages entrepreneurship and start-up investment activity. As with all other scenarios, the indirect effect on managerial advice, if it is positive, will reinforce the direct effect and further discourage start-ups. Restricting loss offset, however, may as well diminish incentives for managerial support and thereby contribute to a larger number of start-ups, each one being more risky.
Output of the innovative sector is equal to the number of successful start-ups pE.
Defining Ψ = 1 − α − pEΦ/p 0 < 0, 19 the net effect of the loss offset provision is
To summarize, the direct effect of restricting loss offset, i.e. increasing ε, is to discourage entrepreneurship and retard output of the entrepreneurial sector. This is reinforced if the limitation of loss offset induces more managerial support. Fewer entrepreneurs are needed if each project succeeds with higher probability. However, the relation between the generosity of loss offset and the extent of managerial advice is ambiguous.
Welfare depends on the disposable real wage. Keeping the income tax rate constant, real wages change along with transfers and the consumer price index as indicated in (C.6).
By assumption, the government rebates tax revenues by means of a neutral consumption subsidy. The required change in the subsidy follows from the differential of the public budget (9') which we usefully rewrite as in (C.7). In analyzing the loss offset, we start from a position of T = 0 and γ = 1, implying
at the outset. Restricting loss offset generates higher revenues, allowing to raise the consumption subsidy by
Substituting (20') and (32) into (C.6) yields a welfare effect of
19 To sign Ψ, we write More projects must be started to expand the industry. The negative effect on consulting reinforces the effects on entrepreneurship and industry supply.
By assumption, transfers are financed with a proportional consumption tax. Substituting (32) into (C.6), the welfare effect of a small transfer is
The
since Q = m with free entry and (1991) have demonstrated, welfare results in models of occupational choice should generally reflect three components: efficiency, equity and insurance. Given that the equity contract is optimal, and with no other obvious distortions, decentralized equilibrium is efficient in our framework. 21 Starting from an untaxed equilibrium, the first order efficiency gains of government policy are therefore zero. There cannot be any welfare gains on account of equity since all agents are identical ex ante. The only source of first order welfare gains is, thus, social insurance in the sense of Varian (1980) . Boadway et al. (1991) further noted that the gains from insurance actually stem from two components which are also reflected in (34), namely a direct effect from the tax transfer scheme, and an indirect effect from equilibrium price adjustment. Apart from the direct insurance provided by the progressive consumption (income) tax, the induced price reduction compresses the return on start-up investment and diminishes the risk of entrepreneurial income. In the scenarios of the preceding sections, in contrast, the government balances the budget by means of a proportional consumption tax and, thus, fails to provide any insurance. High income people pay high taxes but also receive a high consumption subsidy because they have high consumption as well. For this reason, there cannot be any welfare gains on account of social insurance in the preceding section.
To a large part, the public finance literature has dealt with the benefits from social insurance by simply assuming the absence of private insurance markets. In this paper, unconsolidated risk is an endogenous outcome of the optimal decisions of financiers who could otherwise costlessly provide full insurance. Entrepreneurial risk bearing is an essential part of venture capital finance to retain incentives for high effort in the face of a moral hazard problem. It was not obvious a priori whether government should interfere with 21 Given homothetic preferences,
, we can interpret the subutility as consumption of a 'final good' in quantity u i . In allocating u i to workers and entrepreneurs, the planner faces the same constraints as in (13), and will therefore allocate consumption of entrepreneurs to the two states as in figure 1 . Private contracts just replicate this allocation by means of an equity share cum base salary and are, thus, optimal. Whenever a worker gets u units, expected consumption of an entrepreneur must exceed it by a factor c(p). The social optimum is attained by maximizing the utility of a worker, private risk sharing arrangements by further consolidating risk. In the light of proposition 6 we conjecture that the redistributive scheme yields welfare gains from social insurance while the efficiency cost of doing so is zero to the first order. However, as the scheme is expanded, it starts to distort incentives for managerial advice ever more.
Proposition 6 also relates in a non-obvious way to existing studies on entrepreneurship and insurance. Assuming absence of private risk sharing, for reasons exogenous to his model, Kanbur (1980) finds that government can raise welfare by taxing the risky occupation and subsidizing the safe occupation which restricts entry into the risky activity. In the presence of costly state verification and partial private insurance, Black and de Meza (1997) find the opposite result that subsidizing entry into the risky occupation is welfare improving. In their case, government does not have superior information over outcomes but can create collective insurance more cheaply through its influence on equilibrium prices. Our analysis is in between. Since expected income of entrepreneurs is higher than a worker's income, our tax subsidy scheme implies a net tax on risky activities, as in Kanbur but different from Black and de Meza. On the other hand, via its effect on the equilibrium price of the innovative good, the scheme encourages entry into the risky occupation, as in Black and de Meza but different from Kanbur.
Conclusions
Promoting entrepreneurship and business formation is widely recognized as an important policy objective. Among others, the OECD has recently concluded that entrepreneurial activity needs strengthening. 22 The structure of taxes, the operation of financial markets, and the "entrepreneurial climate" are important policy areas. This paper proposed a model of entrepreneurship and start-up investment that emphasizes risk-bearing on the part of entrepreneurs and its implications for occupational choice as well as the 'quality of 22 The recent OECD country report on Austria, for example, includes a special feature on promoting entrepreneurship and employment, see OECD (1999 
Appendix
A Cost of Contract: To prove proposition 1, note that a higher survival chance affects the entrepreneur's profit share according to dθ dp
where the elasticity is defined as
The elasticity is positive and larger than unity. To see this, use (13) and write With the base salary constant, contract cost depends on p according to
dθ dp − θ dµ dp
Except for T , x and therefore the elasticity µ do not depend on policy parameters. To prepare the analysis of transfers T in section 5, we compute
To establish the sign of µ 0 (x), we have to show y (x) > 0. We have y Alternatively, one may verify that all terms in (18) turn out to be proportional to a common tax factor 1 − r, which cancels. Note in particular that also θ is proportional to 1 − r which is obvious from (14) .
C Extensions: Table C Note that the elasticity µ is independent of the loss offset provision ε but it does depend via x on transfers T . To obtain the sign of The program in (15') determines optimal managerial advice. In equilibrium with free entry, the necessary condition is given by (18' ). The reader may easily verify that the sufficient condition (16') surely holds if evaluated at ε close to zero. To obtain the comparative statics in the level of advice, we first need the derivatives of marginal cost c 0 .
While θ and µ are independent of ε, they do depend on T where 
